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SIZE MATTERS: BIG TOBACCO AND THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT JOUST OVER NEW
CIGARETTE WARNING LABELS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
("FSPTCA") requires tobacco manufacturers to place large and graphic
warning labels on all U.S. tobacco products.1 These warning labels are
designed to attract consumer attention and discourage smoking.2 However,

to the chagrin of FSPTCA supporters, the labels have also attracted
significant attention from federal courts.3
Immediately after enactment of the FSPTCA, tobacco
manufacturers launched legal challenges against the new warning labels.4
These lawsuits have resulted in a split among the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals. In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FDA,6 the D.C. Circuit
held that the FSPTCA's warning label requirements violate tobacco
manufacturers' First Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit, however, held
in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States 8 that the warning
labels do not violate the manufacturers' free speech rights. 9
This note explains why the D.C. Circuit, in R.J. Reynolds, was
correct to apply intermediate scrutiny, instead of rational basis review, to
the FSPTCA warning labels, albeit for a different reason than the D.C.

I

See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201, 123

Stat. 1776 (2009) (requiring new warning labels with text and graphic images).
2 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36628,
36633 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141) (explaining purpose of new warning
labels).
3 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, (D.C. Cir. 2012) (addressing
whether labels violate First Amendment); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States,
674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing whether labels withstand First Amendment
challenge).
4 See Duff Wilson, Tobacco Firms Sue to Block Marketing Law, N.Y. TIES (Aug. 31,
2009),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01ibusiness/01tobacco.html?-r=1 &
(describing litigation).
5 Compare R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221-22 (holding labels violate First Amendment),
with Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 531 (holding labels do not violate First Amendment).
6 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
7 See id. at 1221-21 (invalidating FSPTCA warning labels).
' 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
9 See id. at 531 (upholding FSPTCA warning labels).
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Circuit asserted. 0 Intermediate scrutiny is the correct test because the
FSPCTA warning labels go beyond the type of government-mandated
disclosure statements to which the Supreme Court has applied rational
basis review in Zauderer and its progeny. 1 The FSPTCA warning labels
are so big (they take up 50% of the front and back of a cigarette pack) that
they are de facto limitations on tobacco manufacturers' commercial
speech. 12 Because the warning labels are not akin to Zauderer disclosures
and cross the line into the realm of limitations on commercial speech,
intermediate scrutiny is the correct test. 13
In analyzing whether the FSPTCA warning labels violate tobacco
manufacturers' First Amendment rights, the R.J. Reynolds court correctly
held that the warning labels do not pass Central Hudson intermediate
scrutiny. 14 However, the court's reasoning is flawed. 15 The R.J. Reynolds
court should have recognized that the government has a valid and
substantial interest in effectively communicating the health consequences
of smoking to consumers and that the FSPCTA warning labels directly
advance this interest. 16
Nevertheless, the warning labels fail Central Hudson intermediate
scrutiny because the government presented no evidence that these labels
1
were the least restrictive means to accomplish this specific interest. 7
10 See infra Part V. (analyzing R.J. Reynolds). The so-called "Zauderertest" applies rational
basis review when a government entity requires disclosure of specific information as part of an
advertisement. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985). In the commercial speech context, rational basis review is satisfied if the mandated
disclosure is reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing consumer deception.
See id. Alternatively, the co-called "CentralHudson test" applies intermediate scrutiny when a
government entity restricts or bans commercial speech. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). A more difficult burden to overcome than rational
basis review, intermediate scrutiny is satisfied only if the speech restriction directly advances a
substantial government interest and is not more restrictive than necessary to advance that interest.
See id.
I See Principal Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United
States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-5234), 2010 WL 6510607, at *24 (noting limited
space remaining for tobacco manufacturers to advertise on cigarette package).
12 See id. (noting unduly burdensome size of warning labels).
13 See infra Part V (analyzing R.J. Reynolds).
14 See Stephanie Jordan Bennett, Comment, PaternalisticManipulation Through Pictorial
Warnings: The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, and the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act, 81 MIss. L.J. 1909, 1911 (2012) (concluding labels are unconstitutional
under any standard of review).
15 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1223 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with reasoning of
majority opinion).
16 See infra Part V (analyzing R.J. Reynolds).
17 See Clay Calvert & Christina M. Locke, Playing Politics or Protecting Children?
CongressionalAction & A First Amendment Analysis Of The Family Smoking Prevention And
Tobacco Control Act, 36 J. LEGIS. 201, 233 (2010) (predicting that FSPTCA would fail Central
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Despite the R.J. Reynolds court's flawed reasoning in choosing and
applying Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny, the court accurately
concluded that the warning labels are an impermissible infringement on
tobacco manufacturers' free speech rights.18
This note is divided into five parts. Part II of this note explains the
FSPCTA's legislative history and its provisions related to the new warning
labels for cigarette packages. 19 Part III describes the evolution of the
Supreme Court's commercial speech cases. 20 Part IV summarizes the
circuit split created by R.J. Reynolds and Discount Tobacco City.21 Finally,
Part V analyzes the flawed reasoning, yet correct conclusion, of the R.J.
22
Reynolds court.
II.

OVERVIEW OF FSPTCA

President Obama signed the FSPTCA on June 22, 2009, after it
received bipartisan support in Congress. 23 Representative Henry Waxman,

Hudson test because "the fit between the packaging restrictions and the reduction of youth
smoking is not reasonable").
18 See infra Part V (analyzing R.J. Reynolds).
19 See infra Part II. (explaining purpose of FSPCTA and relevant provisions).
20 See infra Part III (summarizing Supreme Court's treatment of commercial speech).
21 See infra Part IV (discussing R.J. Reynolds and Discount Tobacco City).
22 See infra Part V (analyzing R.J. Reynolds).
23 See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Signing of The Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (June 22, 2009), (transcript available in the White House
Briefing Room archives) ("[T]he legislation I'm signing today represents change that's been
decades in the making."); H.R. 1256 (llth): Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act
(On Passage of the Bill), GoVTRACK
(Jun.
11,
2009,
2:27
PM),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/s207 (listing Senate vote); 155 CONG.H.R.
1256 (111th): Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (On Senate Amendment),
GoVTRACK (Jun. 12, 2009, 11:54 AM), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/h335
(listing House vote). Significant interest in federal tobacco legislation began after the United
States Surgeon General described the health consequences of smoking in a 1964 report. See
Kristin Faucette, Note, First Amendment Challenges to the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act: Balancing Congress' Interest in Preserving Public Health with the
Tobacco's Industry's Right to Freely Communicate with Adult Smokers, 6 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 301, 304-12 (2011) (describing history of federal tobacco legislation). The report
stated, "Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to
warrant appropriate remedial action." U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SMOKING
AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 33 (1964), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/
NNBBMQ.pdf. In 1965, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
which required the first warning labels on cigarette packages. See Faucette, supra, at 305. The
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1970 banned cigarette advertising on television or radio.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012) (prohibiting advertising on all mediums of electronic
communication). In 1984, Congress required longer and more descriptive warning labels. See 15
U.S.C. § 1333 (requiring one of nine specifically enumerated warning labels on all cigarette
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chief sponsor of the legislation, described the FSPTCA as historic
legislation "inthe fight against the prevalence of tobacco use, its toll on
human lives, and the clear and pervasive threat tobacco poses to public
health.' 24 Others derided the legislation as a violation of the First
Amendment.25
The primary purpose of the FSPTCA is to provide the FDA with
authority to regulate tobacco products; the Supreme Court ruled in 1996
that the FDA did not have such authority without new authorizing
26
legislation.
Among its many provisions, the FSPTCA requires all
cigarette packages manufactured, sold, or distributed in the United States to
display new warning labels.2 The FSPTCA instructed the FDA to design

packages). In 1996, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") issued a landmark rule that
sought to reduce the ability of minors to access tobacco products. See Faucette, supra, at 307.
This rule prohibited the sale of tobacco to persons under the age of eighteen, the distribution of
marketing items displaying cigarette brand names, and tobacco manufacturer sponsorship of
music and sporting events. See id.Without explicit Congressional approval for the rule, the FDA
declared that its statutory charter, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, provided
authority for the rule. See id.at 307-08 (describing FDA's explanation of authority). However, in
2000, the Supreme Court invalidated the 1996 rule as beyond the scope of the FDA's authority.
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000) ("[W]e believe that
Congress has clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products.").
24 Press Release, Rep. Henry Waxman, Energy and Commerce Comm. Passes Landmark
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Legislation (Mar. 4, 2009), available at
http://waxman.house.gov/press-release/energy-and-commerce-committee-passes-landmarkfamily-smoking-prevention-and-tobacco (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
25 See 155 CONG. REC. H6657 (2009) (statement of Rep. Stephen Buyer) ("While we all
agree that steps need to be taken to help lessen the use of tobacco products by underage youth, we
must not do so in ways that clearly violate the First Amendment."). Rep. Ron Paul referred to the
FSPTCA's regulatory regime as "authoritarianism" and as promoting a "nanny state." 155 CONG.
REC. H6655 (2009) (statement of Rep. Ron Paul). The tobacco industry responded: "[T]he law
contains provisions that severely restrict the few remaining channels we have to communicate
with adult tobacco consumers and, in our opinion, cannot be justified on any basis consistent with
the demands of the First Amendment." Press Release, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company, Other Tobacco Manufacturers, Retailers, File Suit Challenging Provisions of
FDA Tobacco Act (Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rjreynolds-tobacco-company-other-tobacco-manufacturers-retailer-file- suit-challenging-provisionsof-fda-tobacco-act-62107942.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
26 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 3 (listing numerous purposes
of FSPTCA); FDA, 529 U.S. at 126 (holding that FDA lacked authority to regulate tobacco
products). The FSPTCA's other purposes include ensuring that tobacco consumers are better
informed about associated health risks and restricting the access of youth to tobacco products.
See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 3.
27 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201 (a),
123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (listing text of nine required warning labels); Calvert & Locke, supra note
17, at 206-07 (describing provisions of FSPTCA). Other FSPTCA provisions restrict tobacco
manufactures' ability to communicate with consumers about tobacco products. See Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 102 & 201, 123 Stat. 1776
(2009). For example, the FSPTCA requires that warning labels comprise twenty percent of print
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the new warning labels, requiring that the labels contain both textual
statements and graphic color images that portray the negative health
consequences of smoking. 28 The legislation also requires that the warning
labels comprise the top half of the front and back panels of each cigarette
package. 29
On June 22, 2011, the FDA issued a final rule that included nine
warning labels, and required the inclusion of one of those labels on each
cigarette package. 30 The new warning labels are not for the faint of heart.31
One label depicts a man smoking through a hole in his throat with the
accompanying text: "WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive.' 3 2 Another
portrays a cadaver with a chest incision and the accompanying text:
"WARNING: Smoking can kill you.' 3 3 The FDA's rule requires tobacco
manufacturers to display all nine labels on a roughly equivalent number of
tobacco products that are then randomly distributed throughout the United
States.
and poster cigarette advertisements. See id. at § 201(a). These labels must appear in English or
the predominant language of the publication in which the advertisement appears. See id. In
addition, tobacco manufacturers may not advertise a tobacco product as "light" or "mild." See id.
at § 101(b)(3).
28 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201, 123
Stat. 1776 (2009) (requiring promulgation of regulations).
29 See id. at § 201(a) (describing required placement of warning labels). In addition to the
overall label size, the FSPTCA requires the text to appear in seventeen-point font. See id.
(describing size and other requirements of new warning labels).
30 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 2, at
36648-57 (describing FDA selected warning labels). The FDA started with thirty-six images. See
id. at 36636. The agency conducted an Internet-based study of 18,000 participants to measure the
efficacy of each image. See id. at 36637. After considering the results of the study, the FDA
selected nine images that the agency believed most effectively accomplished the goals of the
FSPTCA. See id. at 36640.
31 See Megan McArdle, Will FDA's New Gruesome Warnings Reduce the Number of
Smokers?,
THE
ATLANTIC
(June
22,
2011),
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.combusiness/archive/2011/06/will- fdas-new-gruesome-warnings-reducethe-number-of-smokers/240843 (describing FDA selected images as "gruesome" and
"disturbing"). Some experts believe that graphic images are necessary to reduce smoking rates.
See Ellen Peters, Daniel Romer, Paul Slovic, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Leisha Wharfield, C. K.
Mertz & Stephanie M. Carpenter, The Impact and Acceptability of Canadian-Style Cigarette
Warning Labels Among U.S. Smokers and Nonsmokers, 9 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RESEARCH 473,
474 (Apr. 2007), available at http://ntr.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/4/473.full.pdf+html ("One of
the ways that more graphic warning labels can help consumers appreciate the risks of smoking is
to create unfavorable emotional associations with the behavior. Bland descriptions of the health
hazards of smoking ... are unlikely to create such associations .... ").
32 See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/ucm259214.htm
(last updated May 15, 2013) (introducing nine color images). Three of these images are depicted
infra at Figure A.
33 See id. (describing images).
34 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 2, at 36693
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FIGURE A

In promulgating the rule, the FDA asserted that the primary
purposes of the new warning labels are to effectively communicate the
3 5 The FDA
health consequences of smoking and to reduce smoking rates.
3' 6
'
stale.
and
"unnoticed
are
labels
warning
noted that existing
III.

SEMINAL COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
protections against governmental constraints on speech.3
However,
judicial interpretation of the Amendment has allowed the government to
enact certain speech restrictions."
For example, the government can
legislate the prohibition of libel, blackmail, perjury, and solicitation of

(describing required distribution of images).
35 Id. (defining purpose of new labels). In the final rule, the FDA stated, "The set of required
warnings we have selected will satisfy our primary goal, which is to effectively convey the
negative health consequences of smoking on cigarette packages and in advertisements .
Id.
at 36633.
36 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69524,
69530 (proposed Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141), quoting ENDING THE
TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION Appendix C-3 (Richard J Bonnie, National

Academies Press 2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11795.html (describing need for
new labels).
37 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech ....
").
38 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.");
JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 2-3 (4th

ed. 2008) (explaining scope of First Amendment).
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illegal conduct.3 9
In addition, the Amendment applies only to
governmental restrictions and not to private restrictions on speech. a
Prior to 1975, the Supreme Court excluded commercial speech
from First Amendment protection. a Commercial speech is any assertion
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker or of the audience or
42
an assertion proposing a commercial transaction. As a result, before 1975
government entities had unfettered authority to place restrictions on speech
involving an economic transaction, such as advertising. 3
In Bigelow v. Virginia4 4 and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,4 5 the Supreme Court provided First
Amendment protection to commercial speech for the first time. 6
Commercial speech, however, received less protection than other forms of

39 See Barron & Dienes, supra note 38, at 3 (noting permissible government
speech
restrictions).
40 See 16A AM. JuR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 465 (2009) (explaining applicability of First

Amendment).
41 See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV.
589, 593 (1996) ("For many years, the Supreme Court simply refused even to consider the
possibility that commercial advertising possessed any of the characteristics traditionally
associated with First Amendment values."); Ann K. Wooster, Protectionof Commercial Speech
Under FirstAmendment- Supreme Court Cases, 164 A.L.R. FED. 1, § 2 (2000) (detailing history
of First Amendment applicability to commercial speech). Prior to 1975, Valentine v. Chrestensen
provided the controlling rule on commercial speech. See Sean P. Flanagan, Up in Smoke?
Commercial Free Speech in the United States and the European Union: Why Comprehensive
Tobacco Advertising Bans Work in Europe, but Fail in the United States, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
211, 217-18 (2011) (providing history of commercial speech and tobacco advertising regulation
under First Amendment). In Valentine, the Court held that the First Amendment does not protect
commercial speech. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) ("[T]he Constitution
imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."), reported
overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (citing Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
42 See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 499 (2009) (describing Supreme Court's
definition of commercial speech).
43 See David F. McGowan, Comment, A CriticalAnalysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CALIF.
L. REV. 359, 361-64 (1990) (explaining history of commercial speech jurisprudence); see also
Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-SpeechConundrum, 19 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y
& L. 205, 212-13 (2012) (defining commercial speech).
44 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
4' 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
46 See McGowan, supra note 43, at 364-67 (explaining erosion of Valentine and rise
of
Virginia Board). In Virginia Board, a consumer protection group challenged a Virginia law that
prohibited pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices. See Virginia Board,425 U.S. at
752. The Court held that the law was unconstitutional because commercial speech deserved some
First Amendment protection. See id. at 762. In explaining the need to extend the First
Amendment to commercial speech, the Court acknowledged the important informational value of
advertising. See id. at 765 ("It is a matter of public interest that ... [economic] decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information
is indispensable.").
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expression. 4 The Court provided less protection because of the potentially
deceptive nature of expression that is motivated by economic interests as
weighed against society's "strong interest in the free flow of commercial
information.' '4 ' Therefore, today commercial speech is susceptible to some
government regulation.49
In CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corporationv. Public Service
Commission of New York, 50 the Supreme Court held that intermediate
scrutiny should apply to governmental restrictions of commercial speech. 1
In Central Hudson, a public utility challenged a New York State ban on
advertising that promoted the use of electricity.
The Court established a
four-part test to determine when a governmental restriction of commercial
5
speech violates the First Amendment>.
First, the Court asked whether the
regulated commercial speech is false or misleading.54 False or misleading
commercial speech receives no First Amendment protection and can be

47 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980) ("The Constitution .. .accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression."). Despite extending First Amendment protection to
commercial speech for the first time, Virginia Board implied that the protection has limits. See
McGowan, supra note 43, at 367. The Court stated that "commonsense" differences exist
between commercial and non-commercial speech and that "a different degree of protection is
necessary" for commercial speech. Virginia Board,425 U.S. at 771 n.24. The Court also noted:
"In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of course do not hold
that it can never be regulated in any way." Id.at 770.
48 Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 764 (explaining why commercial speech receives less
protection); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983) (stating that
commercial speech receives less protection because of potential for deception in advertising);
Wooster, supra note 41, at §2 ("Commercial speech is considered to be different from other kinds
of protected expression because advertisers are particularly well-suited to evaluate the accuracy
of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity, and because commercial speech.
is not particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.").
49 See Royal, supra note 43, at 238 (explaining history of government regulation of
commercial speech).
50 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
51 See id. at 561-66 (creating standard of review for commercial speech restrictions).
52 See id. at 558-61 (outlining facts of case).
53 See McGowan, supra note 43, at 371 (explaining significance of Central Hudson). In
Central Hudson, the Court considered whether the Public Service Commission of the State of
New York could ban advertising by electric utility companies. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 558 (1980). During a fuel shortage in 1973,
the Commission ordered all electric utilities in New York State to temporarily cease advertising
that promoted electrical use. See id.at 558-59. Three years later, the Commission made the ban
permanent, arguing that it furthered a national policy of energy conservation. See id.at 559.
Some have referred to the Central Hudson test as a form of intermediate scrutiny. See Michael
Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The
ConstitutionalImpact of Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 267, 267 (2003).
54 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (describing purpose of first prong).

2014]

CIGARETTE WARNING LABELS

completely banned. Second, the Court asked whether the government has
56
a substantial interest in its regulation of the commercial speech.
The lack
S 57
of a substantial interest dooms the government regulation.
Third, the
regulation must directly advance the government's interest. 58 Fourth, the
regulation must be narrowly tailored to serving the interest.
If a less
speech-restrictive means exists to accomplish the government's interest, the
regulation is not permissible. 60

" See id. at 563 ("The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive
the public than to inform it .... "); see also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (holding
restrictions on false, deceptive, and misleading commercial speech are permissible). Misleading
commercial speech includes communications that are inherently likely to deceive or that have in
fact been deceptive. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982).
56 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (describing purpose of second prong).
57 See id. (explaining requirements of second prong). The Court has found a variety of
governmental interests to be substantial. See Hoefges, supra note 53, at 271 (listing breadth of
substantial government interests).
58 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65 ("The State cannot regulate speech that poses no
danger to the asserted state interest .... "). The Court has applied the third prong with varied
rigor. See Hoefges, supra note 53, at 271 (explaining evolution of Court's application of Central
Hudson's third prong). In Edenfield v. Fane, the Court struck down a Florida rule that prohibited
certified public accountants ("CPA") from direct solicitation of clients. See Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 763-64 (1993). The Court accepted Florida's asserted interests of protecting
consumers from fraud and maintaining the fact and appearance of CPA independence. See id. at
768-70. However, the Court stated that Florida did not sufficiently demonstrate that the rule
advanced the interests "in a direct and material way." Id. at 771. The Court required something
more than "mere speculation or conjecture" of advancement, ld. at 770. In Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Company, the Court struck down a federal law that prohibited the disclosure of beer
alcohol content in advertising. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995). The
Court refused to accept the government's "anecdotal evidence and educated guesses" that the
regulation directly advanced the government's substantial interest, ld. at 490. On the other hand,
a divided Court has more recently found grounds for direct advancement. See Hoefges, supra
note 53, at 271. In FloridaBar v. Went for It, Inc., the Court, by a 5-4 vote, upheld a Florida Bar
rule that prohibited personal injury lawyers from sending direct mail solicitations to victims
within thirty days of an accident. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995). The
Court agreed that the Florida Bar's asserted interests in protecting the privacy of personal injury
victims and the reputation of lawyers were substantial. See id. at 624-25. The Court found that a

106-page summary of a two-year study of consumer opinion of personal injury mail solicitations
to be sufficient evidence of direct advancement and that a "surfeit of background information"
was unnecessary. ld. at 626-28. Justice Kennedy, writing in dissent, responded that the study
was noteworthy only for its incompetence. See id. at 640 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In Lorillard
Tobacco Company v. Reilly, the Court struck down a Massachusetts law that, among other
provisions, prohibited outdoor advertisements of tobacco products within 1,000 feet of a school
or playground. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565-66 (2001). However, the
Court, by a 5-4 vote, found a link between the restriction and the state's substantial interest in
reducing underage smoking, because fewer advertisements may suppress product demand. See
id. at 556-61.
59 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (describing purpose of fourth prong and indicating two
criteria used to measure compliance).
60 See id. at 564-65 (stating government cannot "completely suppress information when
narrower restrictions on expression would serve its interest as well"). Similar to the third prong,
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Five years after Central Hudson, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of a government mandate that required law firms to
disclose certain information in their advertisements. 61 At issue in Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio62 was an Ohio
Code of Professional Responsibility that required Ohio lawyers to include
information about contingent fees in their advertisements. 63 The Court
held that compelled commercial speech, in the form of a factual warning or
disclaimer, does not face Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny. 64 Instead,

the Court has fluctuated on its requirements for narrow tailoring. See Hoefges, supra note 53, at
271 (explaining evolution of the Court's application of Central Hudson's fourth prong). For
example, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, the Court held that the
government need not employ the least restrictive means. See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989). The Court required only that a reasonable fit exist between the
ends and means. See id. at 480. For the majority, Justice Scalia wrote: "Within those bounds we
leave it to governmental decisionmakers [to judge what manner of regulation may best be
employed." Ild. On the other hand, in Coors Brewing Company the Court held that the
government cannot employ a less direct means if a more direct means is available to accomplish
the ends. See Coors Brewing Co., 415 U.S. at 490-91. In Lorillard, the Court held that
Massachusetts could not suppress speech directed to adults for the purpose of protecting children.
See LorillardTobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 564. As a result of these cases, the government must now
demonstrate that a less speech-restrictive regulation would not effectively accomplish the
government's goals. See Hoefges, supra note 53, at 271.
61 See Robert Post, Transparentand Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REv.
555, 559-61 (2006) (detailing historical significance of Zauderer). Zauderer applied when the
government-required disclosure statement accompanied a misleading advertisement.
See
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 652 (1985).
Recently, the Supreme Court held that required disclosures are permissible due to a history of
misleading speech. See Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 251 (2010) ("Evidence . . .
demonstrating a pattern of advertisements that hold out . . . [a promise] without alerting
consumers to its potential cost ...

is adequate to establish ...

the likelihood of deception ....

).

Courts, however, have liberally construed Zauderer's requirement that the commercial speech at
issue be misleading. See Case Comment, D.C. CircuitHolds that FDA Rule Mandating Graphic
Warning Images on Cigarette Packaging and Advertisements Violates First Amendment, 126
HARv. L. REv. 818, 823 (2013) [hereinafter Recent Case]. For example, the Supreme Court has
stated that a disclosure could be required to "dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or
deception." See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982) (emphasis added). Later, in Sorrell, the
Second Circuit considered a Vermont statute that required manufacturers of some mercurycontaining products to label their products to inform consumers of the presence of mercury and of
the importance of disposing of the product as hazardous waste. See Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 107 (2nd Cir. 2001). The statue's purpose was not to prevent consumer
deception, but to increase information to consumers. See id. at 115. Despite the lack of
deception, the court applied Zauderer because the statute's purpose was analogous to the First
Amendment's emphasis on increasing information to consumers. See id.
62 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
63 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 633 (describing relevant Ohio Code of Professional Conduct);
see generally Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 231-32 (analyzing federal law that required lawyers who
provide debt relief to disclose certain information).
64 See Zauderer,471 U.S. at 651 n.14 (rejecting request to apply Central Hudson test). The
Court held that compelled commercial speech deserves some First Amendment protection, just
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the Court decided that compelled commercial speech is subject to the lower
threshold of rational basis review.65 Applying rational basis, the Court
upheld Ohio's required disclosure of contingent fees because the
requirement was reasonably related to the state's interest in preventing
consumer deception.66
The Zauderer Court analogized to Central Hudson in choosing
rational basis review instead of intermediate scrutiny for compelled
commercial speech. 67 The Court suggested that both rules facilitate an
61
open marketplace of information.
In upholding the Ohio contingent fee
disclosure requirement, the Court stated that compelled disclosure of
"purely factual and uncontroversial information" is permissible because it
enhances the "free flow of commercial information.' '69 However, the
Zauderer court admitted that "unjustified or unduly burdensome
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected
commercial speech.' 70
IV.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Shortly after enactment of the FSPTCA, tobacco manufacturers
sued the FDA in the Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit.7 The resulting
cases created a circuit split on two issues: 1) whether Zauderer rational

not the level of protection provided for speech restrictions. See id. at 651. The Court stated that
disclosure requirements implicate First Amendment interests that are substantially weaker than
the interests implicated by speech restrictions. See id. at 651 n.14. The Court stated, "[I]n
virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date, we have emphasized that because
disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat
prohibitions on speech, 'warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately required ... inorder
to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception."' See id.at 651 (quoting In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 201).
65 See id. at 651 ("[A]n advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of
consumers."). An expert has described the Zauderer test as "extraordinarily lenient." See Post,
supra note 61, at 560.
66 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (establishing rational basis review for disclosure
requirements).
67 See id.at 651 n. 14 (analogizing to Central Hudson).
68 See id. at 651 ("Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides,
appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information
in his advertising is minimal.") (emphasis in original).
69 Id. at 646, 651; see also Post, supra note 61, at 561 (describing reasoning in Zauderer).
70 Zauderer,471 U.S. at 651 (describing limits to its holding).
71 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting
identity of plaintiffs); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th
Cir. 2012) (noting identity of plaintiffs).
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basis review or Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny applies to the
cigarette package warning labels; and 2) whether the labels survive the
chosen test. 2
In Discount Tobacco City, the Sixth Circuit held that rational basis
review applied because the court believed that the FSPTCA warning labels
were compelled disclosures of factual information related to the health
consequences of smoking, akin to the compelled disclosures of contingent
fees in Zauderer.7' The court found that the warning labels survived
rational basis review because the labels were reasonably related to the
government's interest in preventing deception of consumers . 4 Therefore,
the court upheld the FSPTCA's warning label provisions.
In R.J. Reynolds, the D.C. Circuit came to a different conclusion. 6
The court held that rational basis review did not apply because the court
believed that the warning labels were not "purely factual" disclosure
statements, and therefore not akin to Zauderer. As a result, the court
72

Compare R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (holding that Central Hudson applies), with

Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 527 (holding that Zaudererapplies).
73 See Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 527 (holding Zauderer applies). The majority
and
dissent took divergent opinions on whether the color images that accompany the new warning
labels present factual information. See id. at 526, 569. The dissent stated that graphic images are
subjective and cannot be presumed neutral. See id. at 526 (Clay, J., dissenting). The dissent
explained, "While it is permissible for the government to require a product manufacturer to
provide truthful information, even if perhaps frightening ... it is less clearly permissible for the
government to simply frighten consumers or to otherwise attempt to flagrantly manipulate the
emotions of consumers as it seeks to do here." Id. at 529. The majority argued that images are
not inherently non-factual. See id. at 561. The majority explained, "[W]e vigorously disagree
with the underlying premise that a disclosure that provokes a visceral response must fall outside
Zauderer's ambit. Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response, spark
controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but that does not magically turn such facts into
opinions." Id. at 569.
74 See id. at 562 (stating that warning labels are reasonably related to preventing consumer
deception). The court affirmed that tobacco companies "knowingly and actively" conspired to
hide the health risks of smoking. See id. The court argued that tobacco companies' advertising
inherently deceives consumers if it does not warn them about the health risks. See id. Others
have noted that current warning labels might be ineffective for young and less-educated
consumers. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT
FOR THE NATION
Appendix C-3
(Richard J. Bonnie,
2007),
available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/l1795.html (stating that comprehension of current labels require
college reading level).
75 See Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 518 (affirming lower court's decision to uphold
constitutionality of warning labels).
76 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (holding that intermediate scrutiny applies).
77 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213-17 (describing lack of applicability of Zauderer). The
court stated that Zauderer applies only to accurate disclosure statements that are not subject to
consumer misinterpretation. See id. at 1213 ("The Supreme Court has never applied Zaudererto
disclosure requirements not designed to correct misleading commercial speech."). The court held
that the FSPTCA warning labels are not purely factual because their purpose is to evoke an
emotional response and pressure smokers into quitting. See id. at 1216.at 1216.at 1216 (noting
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applied CentralHudson intermediate scrutiny.
Applying the Central Hudson test, the R.J. Reynolds court
analyzed whether the government's interest in the new warning labels was
substantial.7 9 The court dismissed one of the government's two asserted
interests - effectively communicating the health consequences of smoking
- as insubstantial.80 The court accepted the government's other asserted
interest: reducing smoking rates among Americans.8 1 Nevertheless, the
court found insufficient evidence that the new warning labels directly
advanced the goal of reducing smoking rates. 8 2 The court stated that the
government provided "mere speculation and conjecture" and, thus, failed to
meet its burden.83 Therefore, the R.J. Reynolds court found that the
warning labels did not survive intermediate scrutiny
and were a violation of
84
rights.
Amendment
First
manufacturers'
tobacco
V.

ANALYSIS

a. D.C. Circuit'sChoice of CentralHudson over Zauderer
Despite coming to the appropriate conclusion that Central Hudson
intermediate scrutiny applies over Zauderer rational basis, the R.J.
images are meant to symbolize textual warning and could be misinterpreted by consumers).
"They are unabashed attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat
consumers into quitting." Id. at 1217. The court decided that the FSPTCA cigarette package
labels failed the Zauderer standard because the "FDA has not shown that the graphic warnings
were designed to correct any false or misleading claims . . . [or that] consumers would likely be
deceived by the Companies' packaging in the future." Id. at 1216.
78 See id. at 1217 (stating Central Hudson is appropriate test).
79 See id. at 1217-18 (applying second prong of Central Hudson test).
80 See id. at 1221 (dismissing interest in effective communication as "too vague"). The court
stated that this interest is "illusory absent some barometer for assessing ... [its] effectiveness."
Id. at 1221 n.16. It also interpreted this interest as a means to accomplish a reduction in smoking
rates and not an interest in itself. See id. at 1221. The dissent disagreed: "[T]he government has
an interest of paramount importance in effectively conveying information about the health risks of
smoking to adolescent would-be smokers and other consumers." ld. at 1237 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting).
81 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1236 (recognizing substantial government interest in
reducing smoking rates).
82 See id. at 1219 (noting that government did not provide a "shred of evidence" of material
advancement). The dissent responded that "history, consensus, and simple common sense"
indicate that the warning labels directly advance the government's attempt to reduce smoking
rates. See id. at 1234-36 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618, 628 (1995)).
83 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487
(1995)).
84 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222 (holding that warning labels do not pass Central
Hudson test).
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Reynolds court's rationale is flawed for three reasons. s 5 First, the court
misinterpreted that Zauderer only applies to government-mandated
disclosures that accompany advertising that "would likely mislead
consumers." 86 This interpretation does not follow precedent.8 7 In fact, the
Supreme Court has noted that compelled speech can be appropriate in
response to the mere possibility of consumer deception. 8 Some courts
have even applied Zauderer when prevention of consumer deception is not
the primary purpose of the government-mandated disclosure. 8 9 The R.J.
Reynolds court's conclusion that Zauderer rational basis review only
applies to misleading commercial speech is incorrect. 90
Second, the R.J. Reynolds court failed to grasp the impact that past
misleading advertising has on today's tobacco consumers. 91 The court
stated that insufficient evidence exists to find that, absent disclosure,
deception of tobacco consumers is likely today. 92 That assertion is
incorrect.93 Existing warning labels are ineffective for conveying the
health consequences of smoking. 94 In addition, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that a pattern of past deceptive commercial speech is
evidence that the consumer currently fails to understand the truth. 95 Given
the tobacco manufacturers' history of deceit, a conclusion that consumers
continue to be misled today is reasonable. 96 The R.J. Reynolds court
85 See Recent Case, supra note 61, at 821 (explaining errors in D.C. Circuit's reasoning).
86 See Recent Case, supra note 61, at 823 (stating that D.C. Circuit narrowly defined
commercial speech covered under Zauderer); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text
(describing D.C. Circuit's arguments against applicability of Zauderer).
87 See Recent Case, supra note 61, at 823-34 (explaining type of commercial speech that
D.C. Circuit excluded from Zauderer).
88 See sources cited supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing liberal construction of
misleading speech).
89 See sources cited supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining use of Zauderer in
Sorrell).
90 See Recent Case, supra note 61, at 823-34 (criticizing R.J. Reynolds court's narrow
reading of Zauderer).
91 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1228 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (describing deceptive nature
of tobacco manufacturers' past advertising).
92 See id. at 1216 (arguing that FDA presented insufficient evidence of consumer deception).
93 See id. at 1228 (Rogers, J., dissenting) ("Even absent any affirmatively misleading
statements, cigarette packages and other advertisements that fail to display the final costs of
smoking in a prominent manner are . . . misleading.
... (citation omitted)). Judge Rogers
further stated, "Existing warnings, last revised in 1984, appear on one side panel and occupy only
four percent of cigarette packages. Common sense, experience, and substantial scientific
evidence support the conclusion that these warnings are ineffective." Id. (citation omitted).
94 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 36, at
69530 (describing that public fails to notice current cigarette package warning labels).
95 See sources cites supra note 61 (explaining consumer deception requirement).
96 See Recent Case, supra note 61, at 824 (stating that potential for cigarette packages to
mislead consumer is self-evident). In United States v. Philip Morris, the D.C. Circuit, describing
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should have concluded, as the Sixth Circuit found, that today's cigarette
9
packages are sufficiently misleading to fall under the ambit of Zauderer. 7
Third, the R.J. Reynolds court was incorrect to conclude that the
new warning labels lack a factual basis. 9
The court objected to the
FSPCTA warning labels as having been designed to pressure consumers to
quit smoking. 99 The court reasoned that the graphic images contained in
the warning labels do not impart factual information because they are
intended to induce an emotional response. 00
It is true that Zauderer applied specifically to forced disclosure of
"purely factual and uncontroversial information. 101 The reasoning of the
R.J. Reynolds court, however, ignores the accuracy of the graphic images
contained in the warning labels. 10 2 In reality, the images represent
uncontroverted facts.10 3 The evidence that smoking leads to disease and
death is conclusive. 1 °4 The images portray these consequences in a truthful

manner. 105
The R.J. Reynolds court further reasoned that the images are not
factual because the government selected the images to shock consumers.106
Shocking images, however, do not per se lack a factual basis. 10 7 Facts that
provoke an emotional response are still facts. 0 8 The graphic images in the
warning labels are facts because they accurately portray the consequences

the District Court's findings, stated that tobacco manufacturers "engaged in a scheme to defraud
smokers and potential smokers by ... falsely denying the adverse health effects of smoking...
[and] suppressing documents, information, and research to prevent the public from learning the
truth .... " United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1108 (2009). The tobacco
companies disseminated these lies through advertisements and other public statements. See id. at
1106.
97 See sources cited supra note 96 and accompanying text (describing tobacco manufacturers'
past efforts to deceive consumers).
98 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (stating that
warning labels are not factual).
99 See id. (stating that images are intended to "browbeat consumers into quitting").
100 See id. at 1216 (providing court's interpretation for purpose of warning labels).
101 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(describing accuracy of required disclosures).
102 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231-32 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (explaining veracity of
graphic images).
103

See id.

104 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 36, at
69527-29 (detailing negative health effects of cigarettes).
105 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231-32 (explaining veracity of graphic images).
106 See id. at 1217 (stating perceived purpose of graphic images).
107 See id. at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (arguing that discomforting images can be
accurate).
108 See Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 569 (stating that facts that promote emotional
response are not automatically opinions).
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of smoking, such as heart disease and death. 0 9 The R.J. Reynolds court
should have recognized that the new warning labels, while perhaps
discomforting, satisfy Zauderer's demand that compelled speech provide
factual information. 10
A better reason to apply Central Hudson over Zauderer- a reason
that escaped the R.J. Reynolds court - relates to the size of the new warning
labels.11 These labels occupy such a large portion of the cigarette package
that they are not just simple disclosure statements.1 2 In fact, the labels are
a de facto limitation on tobacco manufacturers' ability to express
commercial speech because they severely limit the remaining space on
cigarette packages available for advertising.1 3
Past examples of government-mandated disclosure statements to
which courts have applied rational basis review are wholly different from
the FSPTCA cigarette package warning labels.1 1 4 For example, the
disclosures permitted in Zauderer and its progeny are simple, textual
statements that occupy limited space on advertisements.11 5 In contrast, the
FSPTCA requires that the new warning labels comprise the top half of the
front and rear panels of the cigarette package.1 1 6 Disclosures of this size
restrict tobacco manufacturers' ability to advertise by significantly limiting
the remaining space on the cigarette package available to the
manufacturer. 117
At least one circuit has held that compelled speech that takes up
half of the space of an advertisement is inappropriate.1 8 The Seventh
Circuit, describing a hypothetical situation, stated, "Certainly we would not
condone a health department's requirement that half of the space on a
restaurant menu be consumed by the raw shellfish warning.'1 1 9 If a
warning label that occupies half of a menu is impermissible, a warning

See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231-32 (explaining veracity of graphic images).
110 See id.at 1233 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (stating that FDA graphic images do not infringe
109

tobacco companies' First Amendment rights).
III See Bennett, supra note 14, at 1928 (stating that FSPTCA labels suppress speech).
112 See Principal Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 11, at* 24 (noting effect of
labels
on speech).
113 See id. (commenting on size of labels).
114 See cases cited supra note 63 (describing required disclosures in Zaudererand Milavetz).
115 See cases cited supra note 63 (highlighting Zaudererand Milavetz disclaimers).
116 See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing required size and
location of warning labels); see also supra Figure A (depicting three graphic warning labels).
117 See Bennett, supra note 14, at 1916 (explaining impact of labels on speech).
118 See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (objecting to
size of warning label).
119 Id.
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120
label that occupies half of a cigarette package is also impermissible.
Because of the size of the warning labels, the R.J.
Reynolds court was
121
correct in applying Central Hudson over Zauderer.

b.

D.C. Circuit'sApplication of CentralHudson

While the R.J. Reynolds court was correct in choosing intermediate
scrutiny, it partially erred in its application of the Central Hudson test to
the new warning labels.1 2 2 Under Central Hudson's second prong, the
government must demonstrate a substantial reason to restrict commercial
speech.123 The R.J. Reynolds court acknowledged that the government's
interest in reducing smoking rates is substantial. 124 The court, however,
refused to accept an additional and complimentary interest that the
government asserted: effective communication to the public of the
consequences of smoking. 125
The court argued that effective communication is a means to
accomplish the government's goal of reducing smoking rates, but not an
interest in itself.12 6 In rejecting this interest, the R.J. Reynolds court
ignored evidence that effective communication of the consequences of
smoking is the primary goal of the FSPTCA.127 For example, in its brief to
the R.J. Reynolds court, the government stated, "The size and placement of
the warning, and the inclusion of color images to illustrate the warning
statements, are tailored to advance the government's substantial interest in
effectively communicating health information. ,128 If the R.J. Reynolds
120

See Calvert & Locke, supra note 17, at 233 (explaining the practical effect of large

warning labels in retail stores); See generally Bennett, supra note 14, at 1926 (analogizing to
Blagojevich). Calvert and Locke note that warning labels on the top half of cigarette packages
combined with opaque in-store display racks would nearly eliminate the consumer's ability to
visually distinguish products in a retail setting.
121 See Bennett, supra note 14, at 1916, 1919 ("Central Hudson should ... apply if a court
determines that the warnings require a defendant to limit or suppress an advertisement's message,
rather than disclose certain information.").
122 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Rogers,
J., dissenting) (outlining FDA's assertion of effective communication as substantial interest).
123 See sources cited supra note 57 and accompanying text (describing second prong).
124 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218 (accepting reduction of smoking rates as valid
government interest).
125 See id. at 1221 (rejecting effective communication of smoking risks as valid government
interest).
126 See id.
127 See id. at 1223 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (outlining FDA's assertion of effective
communication as government interest).
128 Brief for Appellants, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (No. 11-5332), 2011 WL 6179451, at *28 (emphasis added) (asserting government's
interest in effective communication).
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court felt that the government was disingenuous in its brief, the court could
have looked to the FPTCA itself.129 Section 202 states that the FDA may
alter the size or content of the warning labels if "such a change would
promote greater pubic understanding of the risks associated with the use of
tobacco products."13 0 FDA regulations provide even further documentation
of the government's substantial interest in effectively communicating the
consequences of smoking. 131
By dismissing the
government's
interest in
effective
communication to consumers, the R.J. Reynolds court also ignored
precedent. 132 In 1993, the Supreme Court stated, "[T]here is no question
that [the government's] interest in ensuring the accuracy of commercial
information in the market-place is substantial.''133 In addition, the D.C.
Circuit itself has previously recognized the government's
interest in
134
providing accurate health information to the public.
The court also rejected the government's stated interest in effective
communication as "illusory absent some barometer for assessing ... [its]
effectiveness." 135 The court's conclusion, however, fails to recognize that
the government has extensively studied the effectiveness of the new
warning labels. 136 In fact, before promulgation of the final rule, the FDA
surveyed 18,000 participants about the effectiveness of the new warning
labels in conveying health information about smoking. 137 The survey
found that the images are effective in communicating health information. 131
The R.J. Reynolds court, therefore, not only failed to recognize that the
government has a valid and substantial interest in effectively
communicating health risks to the public, but also failed to understand the

129

See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 202(b) (describing authority

to modify warning labels).
130 Ild.
(explaining purpose for future warning label change).
131 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 2, at
36633 ("The set of required warnings we have selected will satisfy our primary goal, which is to
effectively convey the negative health consequences of smoking on cigarette packages and in
advertisements ....
").
132 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (describing promotion of
"health, safety, and welfare of its citizens" as substantial government interest).
133 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993) (recognizing Florida Bar's interest in
protecting consumers from fraud is substantial).
134 See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating restrictions on dietary
supplement labels satisfy second prong of CentralHudson).
135 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
136 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 2, at
36637 (describing FDA's study of original thirty-six images).
137 See id.(providing FDA study details).
131 See id.at 36640 (detailing FDA study conclusions).
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ability to measure the advancement of that interest. 139
In addition to passing the second Central Hudson prong, the
government's interest in effective communication satisfies the third
prong. 14
The third prong requires the government to provide some
evidence that its restriction on commercial speech will directly advance its
interest. 14 During the rulemaking process, the FDA provided evidence
that the new warning labels will directly advance the government's goal in
effectively communicating the consequences of smoking. 142 The FDA
cited studies that demonstrate that graphic warning labels on cigarette
packages in Canada and Australia proved to be effective communication
tools. 143 In addition, the FDA called attention to reports from the Institute
of Medicine and the World Health Organization that reached similar
conclusions. 144 This 145
evidence is more than sufficient to satisfy Central
Hudson's third prong.
However, the government's attempt to serve its interest in effective
communication by requiring graphic warnings that comprise half of the
front and back of cigarette packages does not satisfy the fourth prong of
Central Hudson.14 6 To satisfy the fourth prong, the government must
demonstrate that a less restrictive means would not effectively accomplish
its goal. 147 In its defense of the FSPTCA, the government provided no such
evidence; while stating that the new warning labels are more effective than
the existing warning labels, the government failed to demonstrate that
warning labels that comprise less than fifty percent of the package would
148
not effectively communicate the consequences of smoking to the public.
Therefore, the government has not satisfied Central Hudson intermediate

139

See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1235 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (explaining flaws in

majority's argument).
140 See id. (arguing warning label requirement meets third prong).
141 See sources cited supra note 58 and accompanying text (explaining requirements to
satisfy third prong of Central Hudson).
142 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1235 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (arguing that FDA provided
substantial evidence of direct advancement).
143 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note
36, at
69532 (explaining results of studies in Canada and Australia).
144 See id. at 69531 (describing reports).
145 See sources cited supra note 58 and accompanying text (explaining requirements
to
satisfy third prong of Central Hudson).
146 See Calvert & Locke, supra note 17, at 235-36 (stating that FSPTCA advertising
restrictions likely fail fourth prong of Central Hudson).
147 See sources cited supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining requirements to
satisfy fourth prong of CentralHudson).
148 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 2, at
36633 (characterizing new warning labels as "more effective").
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scrutiny. 149
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the D.C. Circuit incorrectly determined that the government
has no substantial interest in effectively communicating the health
consequences of smoking, and despite the fact that the new warning labels
will directly advance that goal, the FSPTCA requirements are not narrowly
tailored. The R.J. Reynolds court's conclusion on the application of Central
Hudson intermediate scrutiny to the FSPTCA is correct. The new warning
labels do not fully satisfy the Central Hudson test.
They are an
impermissible restriction on commercial speech and violate the First
Amendment.
The Department of Justice appears to agree with this conclusion.
On March 15, 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the
Department of Justice would not seek review of R.J. Reynolds by the
Supreme Court. 150 Instead, the FDA will commence a new rulemaking
process to re-design the warning labels again, presumably in a manner that
does not violate the First Amendment. 151 In order to withstand the Central
Hudson intermediate scrutiny that future challenges to its revised graphic
warning label requirements will involve, the FDA would be wise to
compile substantial data that clearly demonstrates how smaller and less
graphic warning labels would not accomplish the FSPCTA's goals.
Paul A. Schmid

149 See sources cited supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining requirements to
satisfy fourth prong of CentralHudson).
150 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Atty. Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker of the House of
Representatives (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.mainjustice.com/files/2013/03/Ltr-toSpeaker-re-Reynolds-v-FDA.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
151 See id. ("[The] FDA therefore remains free to conduct new rulemaking proceedings under
the [FSPCTA,] and it can address issues identified by the court of appeals and other relevant
issues in such proceedings.").
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basis review or Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny applies to the
cigarette package warning labels; and 2) whether the labels survive the
chosen test.72
In Discount Tobacco City, the Sixth Circuit held that rational basis
review applied because the court believed that the FSPTCA warning labels
were compelled disclosures of factual information related to the health
consequences of smoking, akin to the compelled disclosures of contingent
fees in Zauderer.73 The court found that the warning labels survived
rational basis review because the labels were reasonably related to the
government's interest in preventing deception of consumers.74 Therefore,
the court upheld the FSPTCA's warning label provisions.75
In R.J. Reynolds, the D.C. Circuit came to a different conclusion.76
The court held that rational basis review did not apply because the court
believed that the warning labels were not "purely factual" disclosure
statements, and therefore not akin to Zauderer.77 As a result, the court
72

Compare RI. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (holding that Central Hudson applies), with

Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 527 (holding that Zauderer applies).
73 See Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 527 (holding Zauderer applies). The
majority and
dissent took divergent opinions on whether the color images that accompany the new warning
labels present factual information. See id. at 526, 569. The dissent stated that graphic images are
subjective and cannot be presumed neutral. See id. at 526 (Clay, J., dissenting). The dissent
explained, "While it is permissible for the government to require a product manufacturer to
provide truthful information, even if perhaps frightening . . . it is less clearly permissible for the
government to simply frighten consumers or to otherwise attempt to flagrantly manipulate the
emotions of consumers as it seeks to do here." Id. at 529. The majority argued that images are
not inherently non-factual. See id. at 561. The majority explained, "[W]e vigorously disagree
with the underlying premise that a disclosure that provokes a visceral response must fall outside
Zauderer's ambit. Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response, spark
controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but that does not magically turn such facts into
opinions." Id. at 569.
74 See id. at 562 (stating that warning labels are reasonably related to preventing consumer
deception). The court affirmed that tobacco companies "knowingly and actively" conspired to
hide the health risks of smoking. See id. The court argued that tobacco companies' advertising
inherently deceives consumers if it does not warn them about the health risks. See id. Others
have noted that current warning labels might be ineffective for young and less-educated
consumers. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT
FOR THE NATION
Appendix C-3
(Richard
J.
Bonnie,
2007), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11795.html (stating that comprehension of current labels require
college reading level).
75 See Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 518 (affirming lower court's decision to
uphold
constitutionality of warning labels).
76 See RJ. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217 (holding that intermediate scrutiny applies).
77 See RJ. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213-17 (describing lack of applicability of Zauderer). The
court stated that Zauderer applies only to accurate disclosure statements that are not subject to
consumer misinterpretation. See id. at 1213 ("The Supreme Court has never applied Zaudererto
disclosure requirements not designed to correct misleading commercial speech."). The court held
that the FSPTCA warning labels are not purely factual because their purpose is to evoke an
emotional response and pressure smokers into quitting. See id. at 1216.at 1216.at 1216 (noting
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applied CentralHudson intermediate scrutiny.78
Applying the Central Hudson test, the R.J. Reynolds court
analyzed whether the government's interest in the new warning labels was
substantial. 79 The court dismissed one of the government's two asserted
interests - effectively communicating the health consequences of smoking
- as insubstantial. 0 The court accepted the government's other asserted
interest: reducing smoking rates among Americans." Nevertheless, the
court found insufficient evidence that the new warning labels directly
advanced the goal of reducing smoking rates.82 The court stated that the
government provided "mere speculation and conjecture" and, thus, failed to
meet its burden.83 Therefore, the R.J. Reynolds court found that the
warning labels did not survive intermediate scrutiny and were a violation of
tobacco manufacturers' First Amendment rights.84
V.

ANALYSIS

a. D.C. Circuit's Choice of CentralHudson over Zauderer

Despite coming to the appropriate conclusion that CentralHudson
intermediate scrutiny applies over Zauderer rational basis, the R.J.
images are meant to symbolize textual warning and could be misinterpreted by consumers).
"They are unabashed attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat
consumers into quitting." Id. at 1217. The court decided that the FSPTCA cigarette package
labels failed the Zauderer standard because the "FDA has not shown that the graphic warnings
were designed to correct any false or misleading claims ... [or that] consumers would likely be
deceived by the Companies' packaging in the future." Id. at 1216.
78 See id. at 1217 (stating Central Hudson is appropriate
test).
79 See id. at 1217-18 (applying second prong of Central Hudson test).
80 See id. at 1221 (dismissing interest in effective communication as "too vague"). The court
stated that this interest is "illusory absent some barometer for assessing ... [its] effectiveness."
Id. at 1221 n.16. It also interpreted this interest as a means to accomplish a reduction in smoking
rates and not an interest in itself. See id. at 1221. The dissent disagreed: "[T]he government has
an interest of paramount importance in effectively conveying information about the health risks
of smoking to adolescent would-be smokers and other consumers." Id. at 1237 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting).
81 See RJ. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1236 (recognizing substantial government interest in
reducing smoking rates).
82 See id. at 1219 (noting that government did not provide a "shred of evidence" of material
advancement). The dissent responded that "history, consensus, and simple common sense"
indicate that the warning labels directly advance the government's attempt to reduce smoking
rates. See id. at 1234-36 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618,628 (1995)).
83 RJ. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476,487
(1995)).
84 See RJ. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222 (holding that warning labels do not pass
Central
Hudson test).
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Reynolds court's rationale is flawed for three reasons.8" First, the court
misinterpreted that Zauderer only applies to government-mandated
disclosures that accompany advertising that "would likely mislead
consumers."86 This interpretation does not follow precedent.87 In fact, the
Supreme Court has noted that compelled speech can be appropriate in
response to the mere possibility of consumer deception.88 Some courts
have even applied Zaudererwhen prevention of consumer deception is not
the primary purpose of the government-mandated disclosure.8 9 The Rj.

Reynolds court's conclusion that Zauderer rational basis review only
applies to misleading commercial speech is incorrect. 90
Second, the RJ. Reynolds court failed to grasp the impact that past
misleading advertising has on today's tobacco consumers. 9 The court
stated that insufficient evidence exists to find that, absent disclosure,
deception of tobacco consumers is likely today. 92 That assertion is
incorrect.93 Existing warning labels are ineffective for conveying the health
consequences of smoking. 94
In addition, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that a pattern of past deceptive commercial speech is
evidence that the consumer currently fails to understand the truth. 95 Given
the tobacco manufacturers' history of deceit, a conclusion that consumers
continue to be misled today is reasonable.96 The R.J. Reynolds court should
85
86

See Recent Case, supra note 61, at 821 (explaining errors in D.C. Circuit's reasoning).
See Recent Case, supra note 61, at 823 (stating that D.C. Circuit narrowly defined

commercial speech covered under Zauderer); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text
(describing D.C. Circuit's arguments against applicability of Zauderer).
87 See Recent Case, supra note 61, at 823-34 (explaining type of commercial speech that
D.C. Circuit excluded from Zauderer).
88 See sources cited supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing liberal construction of
misleading speech).
89 See sources cited supra note 61 and accompanying text (explaining use of Zauderer in
Sorrell).
90 See Recent Case, supra note 61, at 823-34 (criticizing RJ. Reynolds court's
narrow
reading of Zauderer).
91 See RJ. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1228 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (describing deceptive nature
of tobacco manufacturers' past advertising).
92 See id. at 1216 (arguing that FDA presented insufficient evidence of consumer deception).
93 See id. at 1228 (Rogers, J., dissenting) ("Even absent any affirmatively misleading
statements, cigarette packages and other advertisements that fail to display the final costs of
smoking in a prominent manner are . . . misleading .... " (citation omitted)). Judge Rogers
further stated, "Existing warnings, last revised in 1984, appear on one side panel and occupy only
four percent of cigarette packages. Common sense, experience, and substantial scientific
evidence support the conclusion that these warnings are ineffective." Id. (citation omitted).
94 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 36, at
69530 (describing that public fails to notice current cigarette package warning labels).
95 See sources cites supra note 61 (explaining consumer deception requirement).
96 See Recent Case, supra note 61, at 824 (stating that potential for cigarette packages to
mislead consumer is self-evident). In United States v. Philip Morris, the D.C. Circuit, describing
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have concluded, as the Sixth Circuit found, that today's cigarette packages
are sufficiently misleading to fall under the ambit of Zauderer.97
Third, the R.J. Reynolds court was incorrect to conclude that the
new warning labels lack a factual basis. 98 The court objected to the
FSPCTA warning labels as having been designed to pressure consumers to
quit smoking. 99 The court reasoned that the graphic images contained in
the warning labels do not impart factual information because they are
intended to induce an emotional response.'00
It is true that Zauderer applied specifically to forced disclosure of
"purely factual and uncontroversial information."' 0 ' The reasoning of the
R.J. Reynolds court, however, ignores the accuracy of the graphic images
contained in the warning labels.'0 2
In reality, the images represent
uncontroverted facts.'0 3 The evidence that smoking leads to disease and
death is conclusive.0 4 The images portray these consequences in a truthful
05

manner.1

The R.J. Reynolds court further reasoned that the images are not
factual because the government selected the images to shock consumers. 6
Shocking images, however, do not per se lack a factual basis.0 7 Facts that
provoke an emotional response are still facts.'0 8 The graphic images in the
warning labels are facts because they accurately portray the consequences

the District Court's findings, stated that tobacco manufacturers "engaged in a scheme to defraud
smokers and potential smokers by... falsely denying the adverse health effects of smoking...
[and] suppressing documents, information, and research to prevent the public from learning the
truth ...." United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1108 (2009). The tobacco
companies disseminated these lies through advertisements and other public statements. See id. at
1106.
97 See sources cited supra note 96 and accompanying text (describing tobacco manufacturers'
past efforts to deceive consumers).
98 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (stating
that warning labels are not factual).
99 See id. (stating that images are intended to "browbeat consumers into quitting").
1O See id. at 1216 (providing court's interpretation for purpose of warning labels).
101Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(describing accuracy of required disclosures).
102 See RJ. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231-32 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (explaining veracity of
graphic images).
103 See id.
104 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 36, at
69527-29 (detailing negative health effects of cigarettes).
105 See RJ. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231-32 (explaining veracity of graphic images).
106 See id. at 1217 (stating perceived purpose of graphic images).
107 See id. at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (arguing that discomforting images can be
accurate).
108 See Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 569 (stating that facts that promote emotional
response are not automatically opinions).
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of smoking, such as heart disease and death.'0 9 The R.J. Reynolds court
should have recognized that the new warning labels, while perhaps
discomforting, satisfy Zauderer's demand that compelled speech provide
factual information." 0
A better reason to apply Central Hudson over Zauderer- a reason
that escaped the R.J. Reynolds court - relates to the size of the new warning
labels."' These labels occupy such a large portion of the cigarette package
that they are not just simple disclosure statements." 2 In fact, the labels are
a de facto limitation on tobacco manufacturers' ability to express
commercial speech because they severely limit the remaining space on
cigarette packages available for advertising." 3
Past examples of government-mandated disclosure statements to
which courts have applied rational basis review are wholly different from
the FSPTCA cigarette package warning labels. 14 For example, the
disclosures permitted in Zauderer and its progeny are simple, textual
statements that occupy limited space on advertisements." 5 In contrast, the
FSPTCA requires that the new warning labels comprise the top half of the
front and rear panels of the cigarette package." 6 Disclosures of this size
restrict tobacco manufacturers' ability to advertise by significantly limiting
the remaining space on the cigarette package available to the
manufacturer.'"
At least one circuit has held that compelled speech that takes up
half of the space of an advertisement is inappropriate." 8 The Seventh
Circuit, describing a hypothetical situation, stated, "Certainly we would not
condone a health department's requirement that half of the space on a
restaurant menu be consumed by the raw shellfish warning."" 9 If a
warning label that occupies half of a menu is impermissible, a warning

See RJ. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231-32 (explaining veracity of graphic images).
110 See id. at 1233 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (stating that FDA graphic images do not infringe
109

tobacco companies' First Amendment rights).
III See Bennett, supra note 14, at 1928 (stating that FSPTCA labels suppress speech).
112 See Principal Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 11, at* 24 (noting effect of labels
on speech).
113 See id. (commenting on size of labels).
114 See cases cited supra note 63 (describing required disclosures in Zaudererand Milavetz).
115 See cases cited supra note 63 (highlighting Zauderer and Milavetz disclaimers).
116 See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing required size and
location of warning labels); see also supra Figure A (depicting three graphic warning labels).
117 See Bennett, supra note 14, at 1916 (explaining impact of labels on speech).
11s See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641,652 (7th Cir. 2006) (objecting to
size of warning label).
119 Id.
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label that occupies half of a cigarette package is also impermissible." 0
Because of the size of the warning labels, the RJ.Reynolds court was
correct in applying Central Hudson over Zauderer.'2 '
b.

D.C. Circuit'sApplication of CentralHudson

While the R.J. Reynolds court was correct in choosing intermediate
scrutiny, it partially erred in its application of the Central Hudson test to
the new warning labels.' 22 Under Central Hudson's second prong, the
government must demonstrate a substantial reason to restrict commercial
speech.23 The R.J. Reynolds court acknowledged that the government's
interest in reducing smoking rates is substantial. 24 The court, however,
refused to accept an additional and complimentary interest that the
government asserted: effective communication to the public of the
consequences of smoking. 25
The court argued that effective communication is a means to
accomplish the government's goal of reducing smoking rates, but not an
interest in itself.2 6 In rejecting this interest, the RJ. Reynolds court
ignored evidence that effective communication of the consequences of
smoking is the primary goal of the FSPTCA. 27 For example, in its brief to
the R.J. Reynolds court, the government stated, "The size and placement of
the warning, and the inclusion of color images to illustrate the warning
statements, are tailored to advance the government's substantial interest in
effectively communicating health information."'128 If the R.J. Reynolds
120

See Calvert & Locke, supra note 17, at 233 (explaining the practical effect of large

warning labels in retail stores); See generally Bennett, supra note 14, at 1926 (analogizing to
Blagojevich). Calvert and Locke note that warning labels on the top half of cigarette packages
combined with opaque in-store display racks would nearly eliminate the consumer's ability to
visually distinguish products in a retail setting.
121 See Bennett, supra note 14, at 1916, 1919 ("Central Hudson should ...apply if a court
determines that the warnings require a defendant to limit or suppress an advertisement's message,
rather than disclose certain information.").
122 See RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Rogers,
J.,
dissenting) (outlining FDA's assertion of effective communication as substantial interest).
123 See sources cited supra note 57 and accompanying text (describing second prong).
124 See RJ.Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218 (accepting reduction of smoking rates as valid
government interest).
125 See id. at 1221 (rejecting effective communication of smoking risks as valid government
interest).
126 See id.
127 See id. at 1223 (Rogers, J.,dissenting) (outlining FDA's assertion of effective
communication as government interest).
128 Brief for Appellants, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (No. 11-5332), 2011 WL 6179451, at *28 (emphasis added) (asserting government's
interest in effective communication).
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court felt that the government was disingenuous in its brief, the court could
have looked to the FPTCA itself.1 29 Section 202 states that the FDA may
alter the size or content of the warning labels if "such a change would
promote greater pubic understanding of the risks associated with the use of
tobacco products."' 3 ° FDA regulations provide even further documentation
of the government's substantial interest in effectively communicating the
consequences of smoking.' 3 '
By
dismissing
the
government's
interest in
effective
communication to consumers, the RJ. Reynolds court also ignored
precedent. 32 In 1993, the Supreme Court stated, "[T]here is no question
that [the government's] interest in ensuring the accuracy of commercial
information in the market-place is substantial.' 33 In addition, the D.C.
Circuit itself has previously recognized the government's interest in
providing accurate health information to the public. 34
The court also rejected the government's stated interest in effective
communication as "illusory absent some barometer for assessing . . .[its]
effectiveness."' 35 The court's conclusion, however, fails to recognize that
the government has extensively studied the effectiveness of the new
warning labels. 36 In fact, before promulgation of the final rule, the FDA
surveyed 18,000 participants about the effectiveness of the new warning
labels in conveying health information about smoking.137 The survey found
that the images are effective in communicating health information.' 38 The
R.J. Reynolds court, therefore, not only failed to recognize that the
government has a valid and substantial interest in effectively
communicating health risks to the public, but also failed to understand the

129 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 202(b) (describing authority
to modify warning labels).
130 Id. (explaining purpose for future warning label change).
131 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 2, at
36633 ("The set of required warnings we have selected will satisfy our primary goal, which is to
effectively convey the negative health consequences of smoking on cigarette packages and in
advertisements ....
").
132 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (describing promotion of
"health, safety, and welfare of its citizens" as substantial government interest).
133 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993) (recognizing Florida Bar's interest in
protecting consumers from fraud is substantial).
134See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating restrictions on dietary
supplement labels satisfy second prong of Central Hudson).
135R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
136See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 2, at
36637 (describing FDA's study of original thirty-six images).
137See id. (providing FDA study details).
138See id. at 36640 (detailing FDA study conclusions).
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139
ability to measure the advancement of that interest.
In addition to passing the second Central Hudson prong, the
government's interest in effective communication satisfies the third
prong. 140 The third prong requires the government to provide some
evidence that its restriction on commercial speech will directly advance its
interest. 141 During the rulemaking process, the FDA provided evidence that
the new warning labels will directly advance the government's goal in
effectively communicating the consequences of smoking. 142 The FDA
cited studies that demonstrate that graphic warning labels on cigarette
packages in Canada and Australia proved to be effective communication
tools. 43 In addition, the FDA called attention to reports from the Institute
of Medicine and the World Health Organization that reached similar
conclusions.144 This evidence is more than sufficient to satisfy Central
Hudson's third prong. 45
However, the government's attempt to serve its interest in effective
communication by requiring graphic warnings that comprise half of the
front and back of cigarette packages does not satisfy the fourth prong of
Central Hudson.46 To satisfy the fourth prong, the government must

demonstrate that a less restrictive means would not effectively accomplish
its goal. 47 In its defense of the FSPTCA, the government provided no such
evidence; while stating that the new warning labels are more effective than
the existing warning labels, the government failed to demonstrate that
smaller warning would not effectively communicate the consequences of
smoking to the public.1'4
Therefore, the government has not satisfied
CentralHudson intermediate scrutiny.
139 See RJ. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1235 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (explaining flaws
in
majority's argument).
140 See id. (arguing warning label requirement meets third prong).
141 See sources cited supra note 58 and accompanying text (explaining requirements to

satisfy third prong of Central Hudson).
142 See RJ. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1235 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (arguing that FDA provided
substantial evidence of direct advancement).
143 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra
note 36, at
69532 (explaining results of studies in Canada and Australia).
144 See id. at 69531 (describing reports).
145 See sources cited supra note 58 and accompanying text (explaining requirements to
satisfy third prong of Central Hudson).
146 See Calvert & Locke, supra note 17, at 235-36 (stating that FSPTCA advertising
restrictions likely fail fourth prong of CentralHudson).
147 See sources cited supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining requirements
to
satisfy fourth prong of CentralHudson).
148 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, supra note 2, at
36633 (characterizing new warning labels as "more effective").
149 See sources cited supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining requirements to
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VI.

CONCLUSION

While the D.C. Circuit incorrectly determined that the government
has no substantial interest in effectively communicating the health
consequences of smoking, and despite the fact that the new warning labels
will directly advance that goal, the FSPTCA requirements are not narrowly
tailored. The RJ. Reynolds court's conclusion on the application of Central
Hudson intermediate scrutiny to the FSPTCA is correct. The new warning
labels do not fully satisfy the Central Hudson test.
They are an
impermissible restriction on commercial speech and violate the First
Amendment.
The Department of Justice appears to agree with this conclusion.
On March 15, 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the
Department of Justice would not seek review of RJ. Reynolds by the
Supreme Court.15 ° Instead, the FDA will commence a new rulemaking
process to re-design the warning labels again, presumably in a manner that
does not violate the First Amendment. 5 In order to withstand the Central
Hudson intermediate scrutiny that future challenges to its revised graphic
warning label requirements will involve, the FDA would be wise to
compile substantial data that clearly demonstrates how smaller and less
graphic warning labels would not accomplish the FSPCTA's goals.
PaulA. Schmid

satisfy fourth prong of Central Hudson).
150 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Atty. Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker of the House of
Representatives (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.mainjustice.com/files/2013/03/Ltr-toSpeaker-re-Reynolds-v-FDA.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
151 See id. ("[The] FDA therefore remains free to conduct new rulemaking proceedings under
the [FSPCTA,] and it can address issues identified by the court of appeals and other relevant
issues in such proceedings.").

